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The endogenous theory of money, developed by Basil Moore, argues that the supply of central bank money in 
modern economies is not under the control of the central bank. According to this view, a central bank typically 
supplies cash reserves automatically on demand at its minimum lending rate, resulting in a clearly horizontal 
money supply function. While the paper agrees with Moore that the supply of central bank money cannot be 
determined exogenously by the central bank, it wonders whether the supply is determined completely by the 
demand of the commercial banks. The paper suggests that the central bank has some exogenous power to control 
the quantity of its supply by rationing. More importantly, the central bank is forced to do so! The central bank 
cannot not merely exist as an automat responding to the wishes of the commercial banks. Part I discusses the 
cause why the central bank has to restrict its supply, while part II demonstrates how the supply of central bank 
money can be controlled by looking at the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem. In accordance with 
this analysis, the paper offers a modified horizontal or “staircase” supply function of central bank money. 
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The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem: 









“While a central bank can extend emergency loans for unlimited amounts, 
its capacity to absorb losses is limited (up to the size of its capital)”. 
Dirk Schoenmaker (2000, 222; emphasis added). 
 
I  Is the money supply function clearly horizontal? 
 
In his book of 1988 on Horizontalists and Verticalists, which should become the fundamental 
text for the endogenous theory of money, Basil Moore argues that the money supply in 
modern economies is not under the control of central banks, even if the most important one, 
the Federal Reserve System, “purports to control quantitatively the amount of banking system 
reserve borrowing” in the US. “Central banks typically supply cash reserves automatically on 
demand at the minimum lending rate. In such cases the money supply function is clearly 
horizontal” at this rate (Moore 1998, 111 f.; second and third emphases added). 
  While I agree with Moore that the supply of central bank money is not exogenously 
determined by the central bank, I wonder, however, whether it is determined completely by 
the demand of its counterparties. Rather, I suggest that the central bank has some exogenous 
power to control the quantity of its supply by rationing or queuing. More importantly, the 
central bank is forced to do so! The central bank cannot not merely exist as an automat 
responding to the wishes of the commercial banks. Part II discusses more detailed the cause 
                                                 
* Revised and extended version of section II of Steiger 2004. To be published in: Mark Setterfield (ed.), 
Complexity, Endogenous Money and Exogenous Interest Rates: A Festschrift in Honour of Basil Moore, 
Cheltenham; UK and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2005, forthcoming. Fruitful discussions with Marc 
Lavoie, University of Ottawa, on the endogeneity of central bank money in the Eurosystem are acknowledged. 
 
** Professor emeritus of economics. Universität Bremen, FB 7 Ökonomie / IKSF, Wilhelm-Herbst-Str. 
5, D-28359 Bremen, Germany. E-mail: osteiger@uni-bremen.de.    3
why the central bank has to restrict its supply by emphasizing some neglected fundamentals 
of central banking. Part III demonstrates how the supply of central bank money can be 
controlled by looking at the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem. Finally, part IV 
offers some conclusions on how to revise the horizontal money supply function. 
 
 
II  The cause for restricting the supply of central bank money, or: 
Some neglected fundamentals of central banking  
 
A two-tiered banking system consists of a central bank, with the monopoly of issuing 
banknotes in credit contracts with its counterparties commercial banks. The latter can obtain 
these notes only by pledging good securities and promising interest, while the former for its 
note issue has – in addition to the collateral of its counterparties – to dispose of own capital. 
Since it is property that is at the core of any good security and own capital, such a banking 
system can only function in property-based societies (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1996, 2000, and 
2005)
1. 
  The central bank must not accept as underlying assets in such a contract any debt 
instruments issued by its counterparty, or by any other entity with which the counterparty has 
close links. Commercial bank A, e.g. will be accepted at the trading desk of the central bank 
with securities only bought from a private company B, or another entity like the Government
2, 
but not with its own paper, or that of a company C in which it holds a stake, even if these 
titles should prove to be highly marketable. The meaning of this rule is that debt titles 
delivered to a central bank have to be guaranteed by A, and not by the issuer of the titles. 
Thus, genuine central bank money always has to be a creditor’s, and not a debtor’s money. 
  In the classical texts on central banking, these prerequisites of genuine money were 
not fully understood. However, the founding fathers of the theory of central banking, Henry 
Thornton (1802) and Walter Bagehot (1873), always tied the creation of money to good 
securities, even in the case of a liquidity crisis. The former was the first to conceive of a 
lender of last resort. In his discussion of the financial crisis of 1793 in England, Thornton 
observed that the country banks ceased to give out their notes because the public refused to 
accept them demanding instead Bank of England notes. Therefore he proposed two rules:   4
“First, ... the Bank of England ... should be disposed to extend its discounts in a greater degree 
than heretofore ... . Secondly, the country bankers should be taught … to provide themselves 
with a larger quantity of that property which is quickly convertible in Bank of England notes“ 
(Thornton 1802, 188; emphasis added). 
  To merely focus on interest, as is common practice in modern texts on central banking, 
would never have entered the minds of Thornton and Bagehot. The latter’s rationale for the 
central bank as the lender of last resort, is far from merely providing liquidity by whatever 
means. Unwaveringly, he emphasized two rules: “First. That these loans should only be made 
at a very high rate of interest. ... Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made at 
all good banking securities and as largely as the public ask for them” (Bagehot, 1873, 197; 
emphasis added).  
  Also Ralph Hawtrey (1932) was well aware that the lender of last resort-responsibility 
must never be mistaken in a way that business banks may be allowed to obtain cash without 
pledging prime property titles. “The essential duty of the central bank as the lender of last 
resort ... cannot mean that it should lend to any bank that needs cash, regardless of the 
borrowing bank’s behavior or circumstances. Neither a commercial concern nor a public 
institution could undertake to supply cash to insolvent borrowers” (Hawtrey, 1932, 126). 
  All three authors emphasized the necessity of good securities because they understood 
that the principles of banking apply to a private bank of issue no less than to any other bank. 
They were beautifully lined out already in 1767 by James Steuart in what can be regarded as 
mercantilism’s most important treatise. Steuart was also the first to explain why good 
securities are necessary. “Many, who are unacquainted with the nature of banks [of issue], 
have a difficulty to comprehend how they should ever be at a loss for money, as they have a 
mint of their own, which requires nothing but paper and ink to create millions. But if they 
consider the principles of banking, they will find that every note issued for value consumed in 
place of value received and preserved, is neither more or less, than a partial spending either of 
their capital, or profits on the bank”. Therefore, he emphasized “that banks [of issue] give 
credit upon nothing but the best  securities” (Steuart, 1767, II, 151 f. and 603; emphases 
added).  
  Thornton and Bagehot were no less concerned than Steuart about the dangers in the 
business of issuing money. “Banknotes emitted without obtaining value in return ... are [a]   5
great source both of loss and danger to a banking company” (Thornton 1802, 244; emphasis 
added). By accepting “bad bills or bad securities ... the Bank [of issue] will ultimately lose” 
(Bagehot 1873, 198; emphasis added).
3 Hawtrey, too, had no difficulty to see the central 
bank’s common commercial woes. “A commercial concern in particular cannot afford to take 
risks out of proportion to its own capital” (1932, 126; emphases added).  
  The balance sheet of a central bank, like that of any other business in the monetary 
economy, has to consist not only of assets and liabilities but also of a surplus of the former 
over the latter. With this net worth or own capital, it safeguards itself against the threat of 
bankruptcy. Only a few central banking theorists in our times, most notably David Folkerts-
Landau, Peter Garber, Charles Goodhart, and Dirk Schoenmaker, have understood this old 
wisdom. “In any credit operation that it undertakes in the lender-of-last-resort role, a central 
bank will incur the credit risk and potential losses, associated with the claims it acquires when 
expanding its liabilities to supply credit” (Folkerts-Landau and Garbert 1992, 99; emphasis 
added). Therefore, “a LOLR [lender of last resort] loan by a CB [central bank] is like any 
other loan, in that it may be repaid (plus interest) or alternatively will be subject to default and 
some potential loss”, and independently whether the central bank is private or “becomes 
explicitly a public sector body” (Goodhart 1999, 233; emphasis added; and see our opening 
quote of Schoenmaker 2000, 222).  
  Only because economists have forgotten this insight, dubious recommendations, most 
prominently by Paul Krugman, were made in recent years to the Bank of Japan to salvage the 
deflation-ridden Japanese economy by engaging in large scale purchase of long-term 
government debt. The idea that such a policy will lift bond prices and lower short-term 
interest rates and, thereby, trigger an upswing, does not take into account that this could 
bankrupt the Bank. The more this policy succeeds in dispelling deflation and the more the 
economy prospers, the higher long-term interest rates will be. But their increase means,of 
course, a decrease in the prices of the bonds held by the Bank of Japan. “If the Bank held only 
10 percent of the long-term government bonds outstanding and interest rates rose by two 
percentage points, the resulting losses would wipe out the institution’s entire capital and 
reserves” (Lerrick, 2001, 13; emphasis added). As underlined by Goodhart (1999, 233; 
emphasis added), the independent capacity of the Bank of Japan for action remains “in some 
large part, though not entirely, bounded by its capital”.   6
  Notwithstanding these fundamentals of central banking, the view of the omnipotence 
of the central bank is maintained by modern monetary economists, most prominently Anna 
Schwartz. “The only institution that had the resources to provide […] loans in a [liquidity] 
crisis is the central bank, which could create high-powered money without limit, and hence 
was the lender of last resort” (2002, 450; emphasis added). How can such a view be 
explained? A closer look at modern textbooks reveals that most central banking theorists 
never have looked more detailed at the balance sheet of a central bank, in particular never 
asked why the central monetary institution, like any other bank or company in the monetary 
economy, must have the item “capital” on its liability side. 
  In Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld’s classical text on International Economics 
(2003, 486 f.), e.g. no capital exists on the liability side of a central bank’s balance sheet, only 
the items “currency in circulation” and “deposits held by private banks”. Therefore, one is not 
surprised to hear, that central bank’s net worth, correctly defined as its total assets minus its 
total liabilities, is assumed to be zero, and that “because changes in central bank net worth are 
not important to our analysis we will also ignore those”. This ignorance is also characteristic 
of Peter Bofinger’s widely used text Monetary Policy (2001, 41-43), where in a simplified 
balance sheet of the Eurosystem the items “capital and reserves” are completely wiped out, 
although they appear in the official consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem on which 
Bofinger’s simplification is based. In Oliver Blanchard’s well-known textbook on 
Macroeconomics (2003, 76), not only the central bank is devoid of capital but also the 
commercial banks. While in Frederic Mishkin’s classic on Banking (2001, 214 f. and 392-
394) the importance of “bank capital, the bank’s net worth which equals the difference 
between its total assets and liabilities”, is correctly analyzed as a buffer for “bad debts which 
have to be written off”, such insights are missing in his discussion of the consolidated balance 
sheet of the Federal Reserve System.
4  
  The myth of the unlimited capacity of the central bank to create money is most 
vehemently maintained by the Berlin School of Monetary Keynesianism, most prominently in 
the writings of the founder of the school, Hajo Riese (1993 and 2000). The theory of the 
Berlin School is interesting because it, not unlike those of Moore and Heinsohn and Steiger, 
does not analyse money as a means to facilitate barter but as a means of payment arising out 
of a credit contract. Riese’s approach to central banking deserves particular attention, because   7
he is the first central banking theorist who has recognized that Bagehot’s discussion of the 
lender of last resort-responsibility of the central bank manifests itself in “the connection 
between the elasticity of the money supply […] and the avoidance of the […] form of 
liquidity crisis” that results, not from insolvency but “from payment difficulties of the central 
bank” (Riese 1993, 5; emphases added). 
  According to Riese, such an inability to pay cannot be avoided when, like in the case 
of the Bank of England in the wake of Peel’s Bank Act of 1844, the money supply is 
restricted by a given amount of certain assets – in the case of the Bank of England: gold. The 
ability of the central bank to pay is not achieved, however, by simply suspending the 
restriction due to gold but through Bagehot’s famous open discount window. This economic 
journalist was first to understand what the economics’ profession of his time had not grasped: 
it was “only the opening of the discount window in 1866 which overcame the liquidity crises 
which had repeatedly shaken England since the pound became a world currency” (Riese 1993, 
11). 
  What is the meaning of an open discount window? According to Riese, it “means that 
every demand for money resulting from a credit relationship is satisfied”, and then only the 
question “remains at to the price at which this is satisfied” (1993, 37; emphases in the 
German original). In other words: the establishment of the central bank as lender of last resort 
leads to the suspension of the gold restriction for the issue of banknotes, thereby overcoming 
the payment difficulties of the central bank and “securing the ability of the economy to 
function” (Riese 1993, 31; emphasis in the German original). 
  However, this praise of the beneficial effects of the role of the lender of last resort is 
bound to the assumption of its capacity to create money without limit. As we have seen, the 
founders of the theory of central banking did not adhere to this view, albeit not always on 
sufficient grounds. For them, generously interpreted, the capacity to create money is limited 
by a lack of good securities of its counterparties and the capacity of its own capital to absorb 
losses. 
  What has Monetary Keynesianism to say about good securities and own capital? More 
or less nothing! On the one side, Riese (1993, 35) mentions Baghehot’s second rule of 
advancing money only against “proper security” without, however, discussing its meaning. 
On the other side, he dismisses the rule as a “strictly conservative course […] − a condition   8
which, alongside a high interest rate which acts as a market barrier against the surge to 
liquidity, is able to avoid the domino effects of a liquidity crisis” (Riese 1993, 38). 
  With Riese’s dismissal of good securities in mind, it is not surprising that the central 
bank’s own capital is not mentioned at all, not to speak of its being made a topic for 
discussion. This is revealed in his analysis of the interaction of the central bank (Z), its 
counterparties commercial banks (B) and the non-bank public (P). The interaction is 
demonstrated by numerical examples of the balance sheet structures of the three sectors. Out 
of eight differing cases of interaction analysed by Riese (1993, 20; and see 24), we discuss − 
see table 1 below − (1), the case of a sale of central bank money to the public, and (2), the 




















Fb   =  claims on commercial banks       C   =  holdings of money 
M   =  money  supply      Vb  =  liabilities to commercial banks 
Fp   =  claims on the public        R   =  reserve holdings 
Vz   =  liabilities to the central bank       D   =  deposit holdings, with C/D  =  0.5 
 
 
(Excerpt from Riese 1993, 20: “Figure 1.1: Balance sheet structures”, upper and lower case). 
 
 
Fb   1200 
Z 
M  1200  Fp  1200  Vz  1200   C  1200  Vb  1200 
Fb   1200 
Z 
R     200  Vz 1200 
D  2000 
B
C  1000 
D  2000 
Vb  3000 
P 
B P 
M  1200 
Fp   3000 
(1)
(2)  9
In his analysis, Riese wants to demonstrate the “bifurcation of monetary demand and credit 
demand” by considering that holdings of money exist for the public – C – as well as for the 
commercial banks – R − , which “result from the risk of losses of assets”. Riese regards such 
holdings as “a market constellation of disequilibrium” allowing for the dissolving of “the 
identification of money and credit”(1993, 22 f.; emphases in the German original). However, 
he does not understand that these holdings on the asset side of the balance sheets of both the 
commercial banks and the public only make sense as reserves with the corresponding contra 
entry net worth of assets or own capital on their liability side. In case (2), e.g. the commercial 
banks cannot secure their claims on the public, Fp = 3000, by reserve holdings of R = 200 
because the total of their assets, R + Fp = 3200, is equal to their liabilities, Vz + D.. To write 
off bad debts, the banks need a surplus of their assets over their liabilities, i.e. a net worth of 
assets.
5 And the same holds true, of course, for the money holdings of the public, C = 1200, to 
secure their claims on the banks, D = 2000. 
Needless to emphasize that the item own capital is also missing in Riese’s balance 
sheet of the central bank. As distinct from the commercial banks and the public, the “risk of 
loss of assets” of this institution never becomes a topic of discussion. On the contrary, Riese 
explicitly rules out such a risk. Why? 
Other than the commercial banks, Riese maintains, who “in principle are faced with a 
liquidity problem because their liabilities, in one way or another, have to be transformed into 
central bank money” which they cannot create, the central bank is devoid of this problem 
(2000, 492). Why? Because that which is the essence of the inability to pay, not having 
enough money to discharge debts, can be created by the central bank itself without any 
difficulty and without making commitments. This can be verified by its balance sheet, he 
argues, where the money supply on the liability side, as contra entry to its claims to the 
commercial banks on the asset side, is assumed to express a “production of liquidity”, a 
“creation of wealth by the central bank” (Riese 2000, 492). “The money in circulation does 
not simply represent, as sometimes is still supposed, some kind of liability of the central bank. 
What should the central bank be obliged to do? To formulate it ironically, the central bank as 
producer of liquidity ex definitione can only transform, again and again, self-made liquidity 
into self-made liquidity” (Riese 2000, 492).   10
However, Riese is not wholly convinced of this explanation ex definitione. Therefore, 
he provides an additional one. It is true that the central bank is a bank, he concedes, but other 
than a “ ‘normal’ ” commercial bank, the former is not subject to risk because its creation of 
money implies a production of wealth. And it is this wealth the disposal of which the central 
bank parts with in the creation of money in favour of the commercial banks. The central bank 
“as universal producer of liquidity is not subject to a creditor’s risk and cannot, therefore, get 
into payment difficulties because of a bad loan. Being risk-free in its business, it is true that 
the central bank is forced to behave most carefully when granting a loan … . However, the 
decisive point is that its holdings of money imply a production of wealth – which in matters of 
bookkeeping says that a central bank books the issue of money as a liability. And in this, in 
analogy to a net worth, the parting with the asset ‘money’ is expressed” (Riese 2000, 493; 
emphases added). 
After all, Riese cannot avoid the term net worth, i.e. own capital which he correctly 
localises on the central bank’s liability side, however, only for “matters of bookkeeping”. 
Thereby, Riese reveals that does not understand that notes issued by a central bank cannot 
represent a net worth for the bank, i.e. a surplus of its assets over its liabilities. Central bank 
money is created as an asset for commercial banks only. It represents, therefore, a liability for 
the central bank, and not a net worth the disposal of which the latter has the option to depart 
with (Heinsohn and Steiger 2000c, 518; and see 2002, 46 f.). By simply looking at a real 
balance sheet of a central bank, Riese would have immediately recognized why its notes, as 
distinct from those of other central banks, do not appear on its asset side and why its net 
worth, in addition to its notes, is booked on its liability side as own capital: without this item, 
the central bank would be unable to withdraw notes from circulation not paid back in case of 
bad loans. Furthermore, central bank money is not an asset per se but “a derivative of assets” 
(Stadermann 2000, 536; emphasis added). Money is a note which a commercial bank receives 
in an interest-charged credit contract from the central bank against an asset to be pledged to 
the latter. By redeeming the note, the commercial bank exercises its right to release the 
pledged asset from the central bank respectively forces the latter to return it. 
Other than Riese, another leading Monetary Keynesian, Heinz-Peter Spahn recognizes 
that a private bank of issue faces a liquidity problem, however, on wrong grounds. According 
to Spahn (2001, 62), such a problem is due to the redeemability of its notes. He does not   11
understand that a private bank of issue, in no way other than a central bank, can become 
illiquid because of a lack of own capital. “Today nearly all currencies in the world are issued 
without the right of redemption of their bearers”. This is true, but does it rule out the liquidity 
problem? Spahn does not understand that the abandonment of the right of redemption results 
from today’s watertight two-tier banking system, with relations only between the central bank 
and their counterparties business banks on the one side and between the latter and the public 
on the other. Only the public has no longer the right of redemption, while it still exists – and 
has to exist – for the commercial banks. More importantly, if the business banks are unable to 
redeem the notes loaned, the central bank has to withdraw them from circulation by offering 
its own capital “when the market value of the collateral is less than the amount of the loan or 
advance to the banks concerned” (Landau-Folkerts and Garber 1992, 99). And when its 
reserve is exhausted, the central bank faces a liquidity problem like any private bank of issue. 
The institution, which Spahn and Riese and even the aforementioned famous textbook 
authors have in mind when analysing the business of a bank of issue, obviously is not a 
genuine central bank but a mere state bank of issue. As distinct from the former, the latter can 
indeed issue notes by buying debt titles from their issuers. Such titles are more or less 
worthless, because they are reproducible in any number and non marketable, while a true 
central bank has to buy the debt titles on the market from the commercial banks who, as 
creditors of the titles, have to consider their inherent risk when offering them to the central 
bank: other than in the case of a state bank of issue, the risk here is with the creditor, and not 
the debtor. Therefore, the state bank is an issuer of a debtor’s money − and as such it needs no 
own capital either because it is obliged in no way whatsoever to redeem its notes. 
The genuine central bank, on the other side needs own capital – last but not least to act 
as lender of last resort. However, as shown above, this role is at the same time restricted by 
the possible losses its own capital can absorb. Therefore, what even the strongest central bank 
deserves is the backing of another institution, the State. “What stands behind the liabilities of 
the CB [central bank] is not the capital of the CB but the strength and taxing power of the 
State” (Goodhart 1999, 234). Therefore, “the central bank’s losses on acquired bank assets 
fall ultimately on the taxpayers. In effect, the taxpayer has assumed the credit risk inherent in 
bank assets that serve as collateral for central bank lending” (Landau-Folkerts and Garber 
1992, 100).    12
  The message of the first part is clear. The central bank has to control its money supply 
for the same reason as a commercial bank its credit supply. The latter cannot satisfy every 
demand from the non-bank public, and the former cannot respond either, like an automat, to 
the demand from the private banks. Both types of banks have to avoid the danger of 
bankruptcy and, therefore, to restrict their lending.
6 In the case of the central bank, of course, 
also other considerations make such a “credit rationing” necessary, first of all, its monetary 
policy goals. In the second part, it will be demonstrated how this is done in the Eurosystem. 
 
 
III  How to control the supply of central bank money, or: 
What could be learned from the Eurosystem 
 
 
The Eurosystem is the de-centralized central banking managing the common currency of 
European Monetary Union (EMU), the Euro. It consists of the 12 national central banks 
(NCBs) of EMU and the European Central Bank (ECB ). The peculiarity of the System is that 
it does not have a central monetary authority. The ECB is not a bank of issue and, therefore, 
not the System’s lender of last resort. Central bank money is issued exclusive by the NCBs, 
with the ECB as a form of intermediate agent between the NCBs and Council of Governors of 
the System, the body that determines monetary policy in EMU. The Council consists of the 
six Executive Directors of the ECB and the Presidents of the 12 NCBs.
7  
The decisions of the Council on the rate of interest and the amount of central bank 
money to be supplied are normally implemented by the NCBs, and not the ECB. This means 
that the ECB only coordinates the refinancing operations, while the transactions are carried 
out by the NCBs. Refinancing means supplying central bank money by the NCBs to those of 
their domestic commercial banks which are in need of liquidity In the following, the 
Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (MROs) and its longer-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) are discussed to demonstrate whether these procedures confirm the thesis of a 
clearly horizontal supply function of money or not. Following a suggestion by Marc Lavoie 
(2004), also the System’s marginal lending facilities (MLFs) are discussed as a monetary 
policy instrument that could save the horizontal supply function.
8   13
  Before we present the MROs and LTROs of the Eurosystem, we will give a child’s 
guide to the question: why do commercial banks go to the central bank at all? Is there not 
another source of getting central bank money? Yes, indeed there are other sources. The banks 
can go to other banks − this is what they regularly do at the money or interbank market −, or 
they can go to the non-bank public − their business of attracting deposits which means a 
withdrawal of banknotes out of circulation. While the first method leaves the liquidity of the 
banking system unchanged, the latter leads to its increase, because banknotes in circulation 
means liquidity absorbing liabilities for the banking system. Therefore, as long as banknotes 
circulate their circulation creates a structural liquidity deficit
9 in the banking system which 
forces the banks to go to the central bank. “Banknotes in circulation absorb the banking 
system’s liquidity because they have to be obtained from the central bank, and credit 
institutions have to borrow funds from the central bank because of this” (ECB 2004b, 88). 
However, the necessity to go to go to the central bank does not mean that banknotes in 
circulation are “under the control of the monetary authority” (ECB 2004b, 87). They are 
clearly not because of the banks’ possibility of attracting deposits respectively the public’s 
preference of banknotes over deposits. And due to these factors, the stock of circulating 
banknotes normally is not a result of monetary policy operations and, therefore, in the 
Eurosystem labelled as one of the so-called “autonomous factors”
10 determining liquidity in 
the banking system. Notwithstanding these considerations, they do not answer the question of 
whether the central bank has any power to restrict the forced demand of the private banks for 
the flow of new funds, i.e. banknotes and banks’ reserves at the central bank. An answer can 
only be given by looking more detailed at the main monetary policy operations of the 
Eurosystem, the MROs and the LTROs. 
The MROs within the Eurosystem are conducted by the NCBs
11 as weekly reverse 
transactions with a maturity of one week.
12 The transactions are executed through standard 
tenders
13 in the form of variable rate tenders.
14 In this procedure, the Governing Council sets a 
minimum bid rate in order to signal its monetary policy stance, and the counterparties of the 
NCBs, their domestic business banks, bid both the amount of money they wish to transact and 
the interest rate at which they wish to enter into the transaction. In preparing their bids for the 
forthcoming MROs, the banks are assisted by a weekly announcement of the estimated 
liquidity needs of the banking system in EMU until the settlement day for the next MRO.   14
However, this does not mean a pre-announcement of the quantity of central bank money the 
Council has decided to allot.  
In the variable rate tender, the banks’ bids with the highest rates are satisfied first, 
followed by bids with successively lower rates, until the total quantity of central bank money 
to be provided is exhausted. The lowest accepted rate is the so-called marginal rate of 
interest, i.e. the rate at which the aggregate quantity of bids exceeds the remaining amount to 
be supplied. At this rate bids are rationed in line with the Council’s “decision on the total 
amount of liquidity to be allotted” (ECB 2004b, 80). The allotment procedure follows a 
multiple (American) auction
15, i.e. the interest rate for each counterparty’s allotment is equal 
to its interest bid. 
  It goes without saying that the Eurosystem’s variable rate tenders imply a clearly 
horizontal supply function of central bank money − however, it has to be emphasized, only for 
the commercial banks’ bids above the marginal rate of interest. For these rates the demands of 
the banks are fully satisfied, while the bids at the marginal rate are allotted only pro rata. 
Therefore, the thesis of a clearly horizontal supply function of central bank money in toto 
cannot be confirmed with respect to the Eurosystem’s MROs.
16 
  A closer look at four MROs between October 27 and November 11, 2003 verifies my 
view. The amount of bids ranged from € billions 113 to 136 and the amounts of allotment 
from € billions 99 to 117, with a bid-cover ratio between 1.07 and 1.50, i.e. in these MRO 
cases the banks’ demand for central bank money was never fully satisfied (ECB 2003, 26). 
However, at a few occasions each year − e.g. in 2003 on March 4 and June 4 (ECB 2003, 8*) 
−, the problem of “underbidding” arose, meaning that the aggregate of all bids was lower than 
the amount the Council wanted to supply.
17 Only in such cases, the demand for money is fully 
satisfied, and the amounts allotted are equal to the amounts of the bids, i.e. the money supply 
function is clearly horizontal. In other words, the central bank cannot determine its money 
supply exogenously by forcing the commercial banks to borrow the money it wants to loan, as 
mainstream’s naïve view of “pumping liquidity into the economy” suggests. On the other 
side, as verified by the overwhelming cases of MROs in the Eurosystem, the central bank 
clearly has some power to restrict the demand for liquidity. In these cases no clearly   15
horizontal supply function exists, but a horizontal function restricted by the central bank’s 
rationing of or queuing for the demand for its funds. 
The power of rationing the money supply is even greater when the central bank 
executes fixed rate tenders, which the Eurosystem did before June 28, 2000. In this case, the 
demand for money by the banks at the fixed interest rate will only be satisfied when it is equal 
to the quantity the central bank want to supply. In the MROs of the Eurosystem until June 21, 
2000, this never happened: on the contrary the bids exceeded the amount allotted 
tremendously. The ECB’s monetary statistics reveal a “severe overbidding […], which 
resulted from the existence of a wide and persistent spread between money market interest 
rates and the fixed rate” (ECB 2004b, 80). In the first half of 2000, the bid-cover ratio was ca 
48.5 on average, on one occasion − June 7 − even as high as over 113 (ECB 2000, 6*). “The 
information given by the aggregate bids was … useless, and the sum of aggregate bids was 
higher than the value of all the available collateral”, leading to unforeseeable allotment ratios 
and the (theoretical) risk of incurring penalties in the case of lack of collateral (Vento 2004, 
83). That’s why the Eurosystem abandoned the fixed rate tenders and introduced variable rate 
operations. 
  The power of the Eurosystem to control the supply of central bank money can also be 
shown with respect to its longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), which accounted on 
average for 26% of the outstanding amount of open market operations from January 1999, the 
start of the Eurosystem, until June 2003. The LTROs are executed monthly by the NCBs, with 
a maturity of three months. They are conducted as pure
18 variable rate tenders with, as distinct 
from the MROs, a pre-announcement of the amounts to be supplied. “The Governing Council 
indicates in advance the volume to be allotted in forthcoming tenders” (ECB 2004b, 82). In 
the first half of 1999 the bid-cover ratio varied between 3 and 5; since mid-1999 it has 
stabilized around 2 (ECB 2000, 7*, and 2004a, S 8). Therefore, also in the case of the LTROs  
a clearly horizontal money supply function does not exist. 
  But what about the Eurosystem’s monetary policy instrument of marginal lending 
facilities (MLFs)? Do they not indicate that central bank money is fully endogenous in the 
Eurosystem, after all? In support of this view, the ECB can be quoted claiming that “the 
decisions on the volumes of weekly tenders are taken so as to ensure that these operations 
close the liquidity deficit of the banking system” (ECB 1999, 38; emphasis added). The reason   16
that there are more bids than available central bank money in the MROs and LTROs could be 
that banks avoid being forced to go to the MLFs, which carry an interest rate, the marginal 
lending rate, that is much higher than the rate applied to the MROs or to the overnight rate 
(EONIA). However, as shown above, according to the ECB “overbidding” has to be 
explained by the wide spread between the money market rates and the fixed rate, as happened 
until June 21, 2000 in the case of MROs with fixed rate tenders, or by “significant interest 
speculation” (counterparties are betting on a rate increase) due to the two weeks duration of 
the MROs, as happened in the case with variable rate tenders from June 28, 2000 until March 
3, 2004 – a speculation which the Council hopes to avoid by shortening the duration to one 
week from March 10, 2004 onward. 
  Independently of whether these explanations are right or not, it has to be emphasized 
that the European banks did not turn their unsatisfied demands for central bank money to the 
MLFs. On the contrary, these facilities were used to a larger extent only after the exceptional 
cases of underbidding, e.g. after the auctions of February 14 and April 10, 2001 when banks 
used the MLFs for a total amount above € 60 billions − nearly equivalent to the total 
underbidding amount of € 52 billions(Vento 2004, 81 f.). The ECB’s monetary statistics 
clearly show that MLFs are used regularly, and even in cases of overbidding, in a minor scale 
only. In the early days of the Eurosystem, in February 1999, they provided liquidity to the 
banks at an amount of € 3.8 billions, while the MROs and LTROs provided €104.6 and 34.2 
billions respectively (ECB 1999, 8*). In 2003, the MLFs had decreased to even more 
negligible amounts − ranging between € 0.1 and 0.6 billions, with a range of € 179.5 to 235.5 
billions for the MROs and € 45 billions for the LTROs (ECB 2004a, S 9). 
The small figures are not surprising, because the banks only use the MLFs “when 
there are no other alternatives” in the money market for overnight loans (ECB 2004b, 74). 
They  cannot use them  as an alternative to their demands unsatisfied by the MROs and 
LTROs.. If the banks would turn to the MLFs, the Council would forcefully restrict such a 
demand. “There is no limit on resources to the standing facilities, although the ECB [the 
Council] may impose restrictions or adapt the conditions connected to their use in particular 
circumstances. Moreover, in the case of the marginal facility, counterparties must post an 
adequate amount of collateral” (ECB 1999, 31; emphasis added). In another document, the 
ECB explains more clearly when and why the use of the MLFs has to be restricted. Within the   17
monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem, the MLFs form an instrument “intended to 
satisfy counterparties temporary liquidity needs”, however, not corresponding to what the 
banking system deems to be necessary to close a liquidity deficit but to what the Eurosystem 
deems to be necessary (ECB 2004c, 23). The Council as the sovereign institution to decide on 
the amount of central bank money to be allotted clearly rules the roost, and not the wants of 
the banks. Therefore, in spite of the fact that “there is no limit to the amount of funds that can 
be advanced under the marginal facility”, the Council always has the power of “suspension of 
the facility” when it thinks that the banks’ demand for liquidity is not in accordance with its 
monetary policy goals. “Access to the facility is granted only in accordance with the 
objectives and general monetary policy considerations of the ECB [the Council]. The ECB 




IV A  modified  horizontal  supply function of money 
 
The message of the preceding section is clear. The Eurosystem can restrict its supply of 
central bank money. Therefore, this contribution concludes that the money supply function 
cannot be clearly horizontal.  
Basil Moore and the adherents of the endogenous money school are right in rejecting 
the view that the supply of money can be determined exogenously by the central bank, 
because it cannot force the banking system to demand funds it does not want. However, this 
thesis does not imply that central bank money is fully endogenous. Central banks do not 
supply cash reserves in each and every case to the banking system automatically on demand at 
the minimum lending rate. On the contrary, they have the power to control the supply by 
restricting the demand through rationing or queuing when they deem the demand as 
endangering their capital
19 or interfering with their monetary policy goals if fully satisfied. 
Therefore, the endogenous money supply function is not clearly horizontal and has to be 
modified. But how? 
I suggest a diagram for the MROs of the Eurosystem, with the different bid rates of 
interest on the vertical axis and the amount of central bank money allotted on the horizontal   18
axis, in which a vertical line is inserted in that part of the horizontal supply function which is 
related to the accepted rate of interest, the marginal lending rate. The vertical line indicates 
the amount of money the central bank supplies by restricting the demand for it at the marginal 
rate. 
In diagram 1 below, the money supply function would start as a horizontal line at the 
highest bid rate, imax, at which the demand for central bank money, CBM
d, is fully satisfied. It 
is followed successively by similar, but lower, horizontal lines for all bid rates, imax/marg below 
imax and above imarg, at which the demand, again, is fully satisfied. Next comes, the again 






























Diagram 1: The modified horizontal or “staircase” supply 
    function of central bank money 
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rationed. This is shown by a vertical line, cutting or, better: “ending”, the imarg-line. The 
vertical line represents the supply of central bank money, CBM
s, and indicates the power of 
the central bank to restrict the demand. It goes without saying that the horizontal line below 
imarg, corresponding to the lowest bid rate, imin, represents a virtual demand only because it is 
not satisfied at all. In toto, the money supply function looks like a descending staircase 







                                                 
 
1 Basil Moore (1988, 222 and 254) has acknowledged, with reference to my earlier writings with 
Heinsohn between 1983 and 1986, that our private property approach to money implies an endogenous 
determination of the money supply. They “have argued forcefully that modern money did not evolve from 
commodity money to replace barter as is conventionally believed, but rather was intrinsically related to the need 
for credit with the development of capitalism and private property” (222). Due to a better understanding of the 
role of property as distinct from possession for the creation of money in our writings from 1996 onward, we have 
modified our view on the endogeneity of money as presented in this contribution. 
 
2 To avoid the problem of “fictitious assets”, popular in Germany in the 1920ies and decisively 
contributing to the destruction of its monetary system, also so-called “financial titles”, i.e. debt titles issued by a 
competing bank D, will not be accepted for the refinancing of A. 
 
3 However, Bagehot − other than Steuart, Thornton and Hawtrey − did not comprehend the full meaning 
of such a loss. While the latter two unequivocally saw the loss of the bank’s own capital, the former stressed the 
loss of the bank’s reserve in the form of its own notes. The holding of such a reserve by the Bank of England 
was due to its particular division into an Issue and a Banking Department. Without this particularity, a central 
bank never holds its notes as a reserve because for a bank of issue they are not an asset but a liability. Therefore, 
it deletes them from its books the very moment they flow back against the return of the debt instruments which 
were conditional for their creation. At the Bank of England, this demonetisation of the notes occurred at the 
Issue Department when it handed out gold against its notes. Therefore, the Banking Department, which could not 
create the notes, had to hold a reserve of banknotes equal to the amount deposited with it by the commercial 
banks which themselves did not hold such a reserve; see more detailed Steiger 2002, 58 f. 
 
4 This verdict also holds for a prominent Post Keynesian, Marc Lavoie, who, in an analysis of a pure 
credit system, emphasizes that the “unique bank could become insolvent … if the amount of defaulting loans 
were to exceed the amount of own funds of the bank, thus reducing the value of assets below the value of 
liabilities” (2003, 515). However, when it comes to the analysis of the two-stage banking system such insights 
are missing in Lavoie’s discussion of the balance sheet of the central bank (2003, 519-541). 
 
5 In economic texts, the trivial necessity of double bookkeeping in the balance sheet to contra an entry 
on the asset side on the liability side and vice versa, with a surplus of (deficit) of assets over liabilities to be 
booked on the liability (asset) side, often leads to improper conclusions as to the character of these items, e.g. in 
the popular view of own capital or net worth as “a liability to oneself”. As a matter of course, positive (negative) 
own capital is no liability (claim) but an asset (liability), because it is booked on the liability (asset) side only to   20
                                                                                                                                                          
equilibrate the balance sheet. Correspondingly, in the profit and loss account the profit (loss) as surplus (deficit) 
of returns over costs does not mean that profits are costs and losses returns, because the former have to be 
booked as contra entries on the cost and the latter on the return side. To avoid such confusions, the Bank of 
International Settlements has proposed to call the opposite of the asset side not simply “liability side” but 
“liability and capital side”; see Blenck, et al. 2002, 39-42; emphasis added. 
 
6 For a further discussion of this conclusion see footnote 19 below. 
 
7 More detailed on the Eurosystem, with emphasis on its missing lender of last resort, see Heinsohn and 
Steiger (2004) and Steiger (2005) 
 
8 An alternative of injecting central bank money into the banking system are outright purchases of assets 
in foreign currency by the NCBs which would reduce the need for MROs and LTROs. However, although 
foreign assets in the Eurosystem provide nearly as much liquidity to the banking system of EMU as it is 
absorbed by the circulation of banknotes − € billions 331.3 respectively 373.2 daily average stocks between May 
24 to June 23, 2003 (ECB 2004b, 88) − , additional purchases are not practiced because, other than the case of 
repurchase transactions used in the MROs and LTROs (see below), the risk of holding assets purchased outright 
is with the NCBs, and not with the private banks. 
 
9 The other factor which has a liquidity-absorbing effect for the banking system are banks’ reserve 
requirements. Other than the stock of banknotes in circulation (see below), theirs is clearly reliant on monetary 
policy operations. 
 
10 The other autonomous factors are government deposits and net foreign assets. While the former are 
liquidity absorbing liabilities and not under control of the central bank, the latter are liquidity providing assets 
and can be controlled by the central bank. 
 
11 The allocation of the MROs between the 12 NCBs and, therefore, of their share of euro banknotes is 
determined by the NCBs paid-up share in the ECBs capital. (The ECB is owned by the NCBs). 
 
12 As of March 10, 2004; prior to that date two weeks. 
 
13 “Standard” means tender operations conducted by a pre-announced schedule, which is completed 
within 24 hours from the tender’s announcement to the communication of the results. 
 
14 As of June 28, 2000; prior to that date in the form of fixed rate tenders. 
 
15 The alternative to this procedure would be a single rate (Dutch) auction, i.e. the interest rate for all 
counterparties is equal to the marginal interest rate; see ECB 2004c, 63. 
 
16 A rationing of its money supply was also practiced in the monetary policy operations of the 
Bundesbank before it became part of the Eurosystem. Until the mid-1980s the Bank’s MROs consisted 
exclisively of discounting bills of exchange or trade bills which were allotted pro rata to the commercial banks, 
i.e. the latter’s demand for central bank money was never fully satisfied. With the rise of repurchase agreements 
in the mid-1980s, discounting survived at a minor scale. As the repo rate was set above the discount rate, the 
acceptance of bills of exchange had to be rationed, of course. 
 
17 From the beginning of single monetary policy in EMU until July 2003, underbidding has occurred 
nine times − one before and eight after the adoption of variable rate tenders (Vento 2004, 81). The ECB regards 
such cases as “episodes” stemming from “significant interest speculation” (counterparties are betting on a rate 
cut) triggered by the duration of the MROs’ maturity of two weeks, which the Council hopes to overcome by 
shortening the maturity to one week as in the Federal Reserve System (ECB 2004b, 82); see footnote 11 above. 
For a closer look on the Eurosystem’s experience with under- and overbidding see Bindseil 2004, 5-15. 
   21
                                                                                                                                                          
18 Variable tenders without a minimum bid rate. 
 
19 In defence of Moore’s clearly horizontal money supply function, it could be argued that the central 
bank usually is backed by a State with the authority to tax and, therefore, the ability to refill the central bank’s 
own capital in case of a loss. This has been done in some Latin American countries (see Fry 1997), however, 
with the result that their central banks, and the currencies they issue, lost reputation, as most strikingly in the 
recent case of the Argentine central bank during the peso crisis of 2000/01; see Steiger 2002, 49 f.. In the 
Eurosystem such a backing would be impossible because its NCBs – and also the ECB − are owned by the 
different member states of EMU, and the European Commission in Brussels disposes only of the tiny sum of 
about 2% of the European Union’s aggregate GNP; see Steiger 2005. 
 
20 Coresponding diagrams for the LTROs and MLFs of the Eurosystem would be in no way different 
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